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In the not-too-distant  past, examining the policy implications of 
specific fiscal-monetary  policy mixes meant entering a game with fairly well 
established ground rules.  These rules stressed the relative effectiveness of 
fiscal versus monetary policy instruments in the context of an IS-LM  paradigm 
in which the causal relationship between high-frequency  real economic activity 
and "demand-management"  policies was taken for granted.  The foundation of 
empirical policy analysis in this tradition was the reduced-form  econometric 
model.  The models were sometimes quite small (the "St. Louis" model, for 
example) and sometimes quite large (the DRI model, for example), but the 
general notion of specifying reduced-form  aggregate demand and supply curves 
remained at the core of most empirical strategies. 
Arguing within this tradition,  Martin Feldstein (1982) pointed to a 
specific problem with the common prescription of tight fiscal  policy (low 
deficits) and easy money -- the failure to recognize the potentially important 
consequences of interactions between inflation and the type of nominally based 
tax system that has existed in the United States for most of the postwar 
period.  Feldstein argued that 
the traditional policy mix reflects not only its optimistic view about 
the feasibility of government surpluses,  but also its overly narrow conception 
of fiscal policy. In the current macroeconomic tradition, fiscal policy has 
been almost synonymous with variations in the net government surplus or 
deficit and has generally ignored the potentially powerful effects of taxes 
that influence marginal prices. 
Implicit in this reasoning is the assertion that the traditional policy 
mix also conceived of monetary policy in an overly narrow way, ignoring the 
potentially important effects on long-  and short-run  economic activity that 
can arise through the interaction of inflation and nominal tax schemes. 
As several of the papers presented at this conference verify, an 
alternative approach to policy analysis has emerged that differs in 
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of the "traditional approach,"  we find policy analysis conducted in the 
context of general-equilibrium  models in which preferences and technologies 
are explicitly characterized and equilibria are obtained by aggregating the 
decisions of individual firms and households operating in competitive markets. 
"Empirical"  policy analysis in this new approach typically involves analyzing - 
the simulated responses of artificial economies to particular policy choices, 
sometimes in conjunction  with formal econometric analysis,  sometimes not. 
Feldstein's remarks,  however,  are as salient as ever.  Even when 
monetary phenomena are explicitly modeled, as in  Huh (1990), Kydland (1989), 
and Cooley and Hansen (1989), general-equilibrium  simulation  models fail to 
find a significant explanatory role for monetary policy in the genesis of 
business cycle fluctuations.  But these models typically ignore the "Feldstein 
channel" -- monetary effects that occur through the interaction of inflation 
and distortionary nominal tax systems. 
This paper addresses the issue implied by Feldstein's argument in a 
framework that is consistent  with the new generation of policy analysis 
models.  In  particular,  we ask the following question: What consequences do 
interactions  between inflation and the nominal taxation of capital income have 
for the cyclical behavior of the macroeconomy? 
Our analysis utilizes the well-known  overlapping-generations  simulation 
framework exemplified by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), henceforth AK.l  We 
have chosen this approach because our general orientation is towards examining 
the value of extending the AK type of fiscal policy analysis to stochastic 
environments.  With respect to the specific question at issue here, our model 
An extension of the AK framework  to the study  of  business cycle phenomena 
has also been developed independently by Rios-Rull (1990). 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmprovides a natural framework for fully endogenizing marginal tax rates in a 
world with a progressive tax str~cture.~ 
We do not explicitly model a monetary sector (inflation is introduced as 
exogenous changes in an arbitrary unit of account),  nor do we consider nonzero 
levels of government expenditure.  We assume that lump-sum  adjustments in 
taxes and transfers maintain balance in the government's budget constraint and 
guarantee the absence of wealth effects on individual households.  Also,  we 
focus solely on the personal tax code and generally ignore distortions 
associated with corporate taxation of capital.  These choices are obviously 
not made because we think these elements are unimportant,  but because we wish 
to isolate the effects arising purely from distortions of "marginal  prices" 
created by the interaction  of inflation and the personal tax code. 
Two empirical observations that become important in our analysis are 
demonstrated in figures 1 and 2:  Over the 1955-1988  period, the per capita 
capital stock tended to be above its growth-adjusted  mean and aggregate per 
capita hours tended to be below its mean in periods when inflation tended to 
be above its sample average.3  Our numerical model generally mimics this 
pattern,  a surprising result given that we allow inflation to distort capital 
income tax liabilities and we fully index wage income. 
McGrattan  (1989)  considers  the  cyclical  consequences  of  stochastic 
"average"  marginal tax rates in a variant of the model developed  by Kydland and 
Prescott (1982).  In  her analysis,  marginal tax rates are partially endogenous 
in that the stochastic process for the average marginal tax rate depends on 
realizations of lagged aggregate variables.  They are not determined,  however, 
as the outcome of individual decisions  made under a structural tax regime. 
The  capital  stock measure  is  private  fixed  nonresidential  capital, 
measured  at the end of the year (net of depreciation) and detrended by  the 
deterministic growth rate of per capita consumption expenditures on nondurable 
goods and services.  Total hours is calculated  by annual average  hours worked in 
nonagricultural establishments  multiplied  by the total civilian  population. The 
consequences of  choosing these particular  measures will  be dealt  with  briefly in 
our concluding remarks. 
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In  a mechanical sense,  our simulations yield these counterintuitive 
results for the following reasons.  The level of the capital stock is 
dominated by shocks to the model's  "technology variable": Given the behavior 
of technology shocks,  inflation-induced  variations in taxes on capital income 
have only a small effect on the cyclical behavior of the capital stock.  But 
because the preference specification  we use in our simulations implies that 
technology growth exerts offsetting substitution and income effects on the 
household leisure choice in the long-run,  aggregate hours tend to exhibit 
greater sensitivity to inflation shocks than does the capital stock. 
The effect on hours occurs for two reasons.  The first is that 
individuals are taxed on nominal asset income.  Because inflation is 
persistent, an inflation shock decreases the after-tax  rate of return on 
savings,  causing individuals to substitute intertemporally toward current 
consumption and current leisure.  That is,  higher inflation causes hours 
worked to decrease and current consumption to increase.  This drives the 
model's  relationship between inflation and aggregate hours. 
The second is due to a kind of "bracket creep":  Even though we assume 
wage payments are indexed when determining taxable income,  the effect of 
overstating real capital income in an inflationary environment causes 
inflation-induced  increases in marginal tax rates.  With flat taxes,  the 
variability of hours is not affected by the introduction  of variable 
inflation.  With progressive taxes,  however,  the variability of hours 
increases substantially and the covariance between hours worked and output 
falls substantially with the introduction of variable inflation.  Introducing 
inflation/tax  interactions also appears to have some effect on the 
outputfiours correlation. 
The conclusions of our investigations are considerably different from 
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what we had conjectured a priori.  Despite the fact that the model predicts 
"significant" steady-state  effects of inflation/nominal-tax interactions,  we 
find that although variable inflation does appear to increase the variability 
of consumption  and decrease the variability of investment somewhat,  there is 
little indication in our model that these types of interactions are necessary 
to explain the broad statistical characteristics of the postwar U.S. economy. 
Furthermore, to the extent that inflationary biases from capital-income 
mismeasurement affect cyclical behavior, the effects appear to affect labor 
more than capital. 
11. A Brief Look at Inflation and the U.S. Economy 
Table 1 presents selected sample moments for several key macroeconomic 
variables over the 1955-1988  period.  Most of the variables,  all of which are 
described in the table, are expressed in logarithms and as deviations from a 
common deterministic trend.  The exceptions are aggregate hours, the average 
marginal tax rate,  and inflation.  In accordance with our simulation 
framework,  aggregate hours and inflation (which is expressed in levels) are 
treated as trendless stationary variables.  A separate trend was estimated for 
the average marginal tax rate. 
Most of the information in table 1 is recognizable from almost any real 
business cycle study.  However,  our detrending procedure differs from the more 
common approach of filtering the data using the method first suggested by 
Hodrick and Prescott (1980).4  Relative to the population moments obtained 
As Kydland and Prescott (1990) note, the Hodrick-Prescott  filter can  be 
thought of as an approximation to stochastic variation in trend.  Although we 
have chosen to use a log-linear  deterministic trend as a first  pass at the data, 
we plan to examine the consequences of alternative filtering techniques at a 
later time.  Even though the exact nature of "stylized facts" may be filter 
dependent (see, for instance, Nelson and Kang  [I9811 and Cogley  [I9901  ) ,  the 
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using the Hodrick-Prescott  filter,  the deterministic log-linear  filter 
reverses the relative size of the standard deviations of hours and 
productivity and substantially increases the relative standard deviation of 
the capital stock. 
For purposes of this investigation,  we focus on the behavior of tax 
variables and the correlations of aggregate variables with inflation.  We can 
see from table 1 that, for the chosen sample period,  -personal  tax revenues are 
roughly two and one-half  times as variable as GNP,  while average marginal tax 
rates are roughly half as variable as GNP.  Inflation  has a much stronger 
contemporaneous correlation  with tax revenues than with average marginal tax 
rates.  The contemporaneous correlation of personal tax revenues with output 
is positive, although small,  while the correlation between output and average 
marginal tax rates is strongly negative. 
The correlations of inflation and investment and inflation and the 
capital stock are .6 and .67,  respectively.  The correlations of inflation 
with output and consumption are both positive (.l and .26,  respectively), but 
much lower than the investment/inflation correlation.  The correlation of 
hours and inflation,  on the other hand, is negative and equal to -.36. 
Attempting to understand these patterns in the context of inflation/tax 
interactions is the primary goal of our dynamic simulations in section VII. 
111. The Simulation Framework 
A. Households and Preferences 
Our model is an overlapping-generations  framework with a basic structure 
ability of the simulation  model to mimic population  moments should  be independent 
of the filtering technique if the model is indeed a useful characterization of 
the real economy. 
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similar to that of AK.  In the basic AK framework,  the economy is populated by 
a sequence of distinct cohorts that are,  with the exception of size,  identical 
in every respect.  Each generation is l+n times larger than its predecessor, 
and like AK,  we assume that individuals live for 55 periods with perfect 
certainty. 
In our version of the AK model, individuals alive in calendar time s 
choose expected consumption and leisure paths to maximize the expected value 
of a time-separable  utility function given by 
where t indicates cohort age at time s and cj,,+j-,(lj,,+j-,)  is the consumption 
(leisure) of an age j individual at time s+j-t.  The preference parameters p, 
a,,  UL, and a represent,  respectively,  the individual's subjective time- 
discount factor,  the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution 
in consumption (c),  the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution in leisure (I), and the utility weight of leisure. 
The operator E,  is a mathematical expectation conditional on the 
information set n,.  We assume throughout that n,  includes the realizations of 
all stochastic variables up through time s.  Since all of our simulation 
experiments assume fixed statutory tax codes,  n,  also includes knowledge of 
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the nominal tax structure for all s.~ 
The time s budget equation for individuals aged t is given by 
where a,,,  refers to nonhuman asset acquisitions and Tt,,  refers to personal 
tax payments.  The pre-tax  market wage at time s is given by w,,  and the 
variable tt is an exogenous productivity endowment of an individual in the tth 
period of life. 
Nonhuman assets represent claims to physical capital that earn a nominal 
one-period  rate of return R,.  We assume the existence of a single homogeneous 
asset class,  thus eliminating the potential consequences of tax-induced 
portfolio adjustments that would occur in a model with heterogeneous assets. 
Personal tax payments in the model arise from a progressive income tax 
supplemented by a system of lump-sum  transfers.  Total tax payments are thus 
given by 
where y is the tax base, g(.)  is a function relating the tax base to marginal 
tax rates,  and rtrS  is a lump-sum  tax (or transfer).  We assume throughout 
Rate structures and personal exemption levels in the personal tax code 
were relatively stable  until the late 1970s. Similarly,  changes in the treatment 
of income from capital gains and personal deduction provisions were relatively 
infrequent until  the  early  to  middle  1970s. Since  that  time, however, the 
frequency  of  structural  changes  in  the  personal  tax  code  has  increased 
dramatically.  The assumption that individuals  take the tax structure as fixed is 
therefore a better approximation for the first 20-25  years of the post-World  War 
I1 era than for the period since the mid-1970s  (in the United States,  at least)  . 
Bizer  and  Judd  (1989)  discuss  some  of  the  consequences  of  stochastic  tax 
structures in the context  of  a tax structure  with exogenous  marginal tax rates. 
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through the income tax.  In  so doing,  we concentrate our attentions on the 
pure distortionary effects of the tax system. 
We define the tax base y* as 
where D,,,  represents adjustments to gross income such as allowable deductions 
and personal exemptions.  By defining taxable income in this way,  we are 
implicitly adjusting tax brackets for inflation in a manner that is roughly 
consistent with the indexing provisions in the current tax code (see Tatom 
[I9851 and Altig and Carlstrom [1991]  for a discussion of those provisions). 
Our definition of the tax base means that, for any s,  real capital 
income is overstated by an amount equal to .Ir,a,-l/(l+.Ir,).6  This overstatement 
causes inflation to have real effects that can arise through two separate 
channels.  The first is a pure capital-income  mismeasurement effect that 
lowers the after-tax  real return to capital when nominal interest rates rise. 
The second is a type of  bracket creep effect that occurs under a progressive 
tax system when overstatement of real capital income pushes individual 
taxpayers into higher marginal tax brackets.  We will see that both of these 
effects can affect the behavior of aggregate hours, a result alluded to in the 
introduction. 
In  addition to equation (2),  we impose the initial condition ao,,=O for 
all s,  and the terminal condition that the present value of lifetime resources 
not exceed the present value of lifetime consumption plus tax payments.  In 
Real capital income is given by  (R,  -T,)  a,-l/(l+.lr,) .  Deflating nominal 
income by l+~,  thus overstates real income by .Irsas-l/(l+.Ir,) . 
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the absence of a bequest motive and lifetime uncertainty, the wealth 
constraint implies that a55,  ,=0. 
Equations (1)-(4)  yield the first-order  conditions 
and 
or,  in more familiar terms, 
and 
where py,  is the marginal tax rate of an individual with taxable income y*. 
B. Firms and Technologv 
Output in the model is produced by competitive firms that combine 
capital (K)  and labor (L) using a neoclassical production technology.  The 
aggregate production technology is Cobb-Douglas,  defined over aggregate 
capital and labor supplies as 
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factor,  p  is the deterministic growth rate of effective labor units,  and z, is 
the realization of a stochastic labor-augmenting  "technology ~ariable."~  In 
what follows,  we normalize A to one. 
We follow Prescott (1986) and assume that z, is generated by the process 
2,  =  tlZ,-l  +  £,I  (10) 
where <,  is the realization  of an independent and identically distributed 
(iid) normal random variable with mean zero.  We further assume that the 
absolute value of  is strictly less than one. 
Aggregate capital and labor supplies are defined from individual 
supplies as 
5 5 
K,  =  (l+n)'-'E  at,  s-1 
t=l  (l+n)  t-55 
and 
Note that equations (11) and (12) are just the capital- and labor-market 
The debate over the exact nature of this "technology variable," which 
empirically is just the part of GNP that cannot be explained by measured labor 
and capital inputs under the maintained aggregate production technology,  is well 
known and need  not be  rehashed here.  We refer  interested  readers  to  the 
discussions in Prescott (1986), Summers (1986), McCallum (1989), and Eichenbaum 
(1990). 
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adjusted aggregate labor supply given in equation (12) and the technology 
parameter z,.  Dividing both sides of equation (9) by exp(ps+z,)L,  yields a 
stationary relationship in terms of the effective capital-labor  ratio, given 
by 
Under the standard assumption of competitive markets, the.pre-tax  real wage 
and nominal interest rates are given by 
and 
R,  =  (0k;-l-6)  (l+x,) + x  9'  (15) 
where 6 is a constant real rate of depreciation on physical capital.  We 
assume throughout that,  for tax purposes, capital income is calculated 
exclusive of real depreciation costs.' 
Finally,  we complete our description of the model by including the 
goods-market  clearing condition given by 
The effect of inflation on investment decisions under historical cost 
depreciation  rules  is  of  course  central  to  any  complete  discussion  of 
inflation/tax-system interactions.  The literature that specifically examines 
this issue is quite large.  A  few examples that concentrate on quantitative 
aspects  of the issue  are Feldstein  and Summers (1979), Auerbach (1983), and  King 
and Fullerton (1984). 
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Note again that we do not explicitly model a monetary sector.  Inflation 
is introduced into our framework by the addition of an arbitrary unit of 
account.  We thus ignore the effects of seigniorage  and any distortions that 
arise through monetary channels per se. 
IV. Solving the Model 
The steady state of the model is solved by setting the values of the 
stochastic variables z, and n,  equal to their unconditional means and applying 
the iterative procedure described in AK (chapter 4).  This section  briefly 
describes the procedure we use for simulating what we loosely refer to as the 
stochastic path of the economy. 
The steady-state  calculations provide us with endpoints for the 
stochastic transition  path simulations.  The behavior of the economy along the 
stochastic path is derived by calculating a sequence of transitions to 
deterministic steady states arising from a sequence of inflation and 
technology "shocks." The stochastic path of the economy is given by the 
envelope of the first-period  observations obtained from each of these 
transition  paths.  Specifically,  we proceed as follows: 
(i)  Starting from the initial steady state,  we set the realization  of z1 
and n1  equal to the actual values calculated for the U.S. economy in 1951. 
Given assumed stochastic processes for inflation and the technology variable 
(described in the next section),  these realizations imply conditional 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmexpectations for the time paths of z, and R,  for s = l...~.  The implied 
expected values of inflation and the technology variables are then substituted 
into individual first-order  conditions and wealth constraints to obtain 
certainty equivalent transition paths to the deterministic steady state.g 
Assuming no further shocks to the inflation or technology process, these 
transition paths correspond exactly to the perfect foresight transition paths 
calculated in the typical AK  simulation exercise.  The initial element of the 
transition path calculated in this way gives us our observations of the 
economy for s=l  . 
(ii) The asset levels obtained for the s=l calculations are used as 
inputs for the second stochastic path observation,  s=2.  For example, the 
assets accumulated by the age t cohort at s=l would be those brought into the 
period by the cohort that is age t+l at time s=2.  From equation (ll), 
aggregate asset accumulation at s=l provides the capital stock for the 
calculations at time s=2. 
(iii) Given the initial conditions implied by the s=l calculations,  the 
1952  values of inflation and the technology variable are used to repeat the 
procedure described in step (i).  Specifically,  the new values of z  and n 
imply a revision in the expected path of inflation and the technology 
variable.  Based on the revisions of this expected path and the period's 
initial conditions,  a new transition to the deterministic steady state is 
calculated,  the initial observation of  which describes the economy at s=2. 
(iv) The entire sequence of stochastic path observations is obtained by 
repeating steps (i)-(iii)  using observations of the calculations at s-1  as 
Because  we  assume  stationary processes  for both  inflation and  the 
technology  parameter,  the steady state is invariant to specific realizations of 
these processes.  In  the actual simulations,  we allow the model 110 periods to 
converge to the steady state. 
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initial conditions for time s and the realized values of inflation and the 
technology variable for the U.S. economy from 1951 through 1988. This 
procedure is represented schematically in figure 3.1° 
V. Parameterizing the Model 
Once values are chosen for the model's parameters, solutions are 
obtained using the numerical methods just described.  Our benchmark values for 
most of the preference and technology parameters are reported in table 2. 
These values are generally consistent with those found in other simulation 
studies (see,  for example,  AK  and Prescott [1986]) and are motivated by 
independent empirical studies.'' 
The sensitivity of our simulations to selected parameter assumptions is 
partially addressed in the next section.  The main focus of the balance of 
this section is the motivation for three elements not described in table 2: 
the personal tax code,  the stochastic processes for the technology variable, 
and the rate of inflation.  We base each of these parameterizations on simple 
regression analysis. 
A. The Personal Tax Code 
We model marginal tax rates as a linear function of taxable income. 
Thus, g(y)  in equation (3)  is given by 
lo It is not possible in general to guarantee that the model will converge 
to  a unique equilibrium.  The best that can typically be done is to hope for 
convergence and examine the sensitivity of the model's  solutions to  starting 
values.  See, for example, the  discussions in Rios-Rull (1990)  and  Laitner 
(1990). 
l1  An exception is the preference parameter a,  which measures the utility 
weight of leisure. Our  choice of a=.5  implies that  the  average  individual 
allocates approximately 24 percent of his or her total time to  labor-market 
activity in the steady state.  This amounts to an average workweek of just over 
40 hours. 
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where y is defined as in equation (4).  As a benchmark case,  we obtained the 
parameters go and gl  by regressing marginal tax rates for married persons 
filing jointly on the taxable income levels mandated by the 1965 tax code (in 
1988 dollars).  This procedure yields the values go=.146 and gl=.0000023. 
The 1965 personal tax rate structure was chosen for three reasons. 
First,  the 1965 rate structure,  which was designated in the Revenue Act of 
1964,  was in effect longer than any other postwar rate structure.  Second,  a 
linear function seems to fit the 1965 rate structure reasonably we11.12 
Third,  linear approximations of the 1965 rate structure yield values of gl 
that are smaller than those obtained by performing analogous regressions with 
other postwar rate structures.  Since the benchmark tax structure turns out to 
be too progressive in some important ways, our results would not be improved 
by imposing tax structures that are more progressive (in the sense of yielding 
larger values of gl). 
In addition to choosing the tax parameters go and gl,  it is necessary to 
convert the gross income figures determined by the model into taxable income 
values to be used in determining marginal tax rates.  We proceed in two steps, 
first scaling the absolute levels of gross income and then adjusting gross 
income to arrive at taxable income values (by specifying levels for deductions 
l2  By  "reasonably well" we mean that a linear function is a good choice 
among the class of  continuous,  differentiable functions.  It is unclear how our 
results  would be biased by approximating the discrete tax code with a continuous 
(and differentiable) function.  On one hand,  the discreteness of the true rate 
structure  means that many people face  constant tax rates at the margin,  a feature 
that is obviously not captured by the linear rate structure we impose.  On the 
other hand,  changes in  marginal tax rates in the true personal tax code are much 
larger for affected individuals than changes implied by our hypothetical tax 
code. We are currently  working on  extensions of the model that we hope will shed 
light on this issue. 
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and personal exemptions).  The details of our calculations are described in an 
appendix. 
B. The Inflation and Technology Processes 
As noted in section 111,  our stochastic path simulations use realized 
values of inflation  and the technology variable for the U.S. economy over the 
period 1951-1988. The inflation variable is simply the growth rate in the 
CPI-U.  The technology variable z is calculated from the relationship 
z~ = ln(Y,)  - [ln(A) +  ps +  (1-6)ln(L,)  + 6ln(~,)],  (19) 
which comes directly from equation (9). 
Equation (19) is made empirically operational by letting Y equal annual 
GNP,  K equal the fixed nonresidential capital stock,  and L  equal total hours 
calculated from data on  hours and total employment (see table 1 for exact 
definitions and data sources).  We set 8=.36 in constructing the series 
described by equation (19). 
Note that we eliminate the deterministic trend when calculating the 
value of the technology variable.  This allows us to solve the simulation 
model assuming zero growth per capita.  In  particular, this approach avoids 
problems presented by the growth in the real wage indicated by equation 
(14) .  l3 
Parameterizing expectations requires choosing specific processes for 
inflation and the technology variable.  The latter is provided by taking the 
series calculated according to equation (17) and estimating the model given in 
l3 This clarification was prompted by the remarks of Alan Auerbach. See 
Hansen (1989) for a detailed discussion of the technical issues associated with 
growth in real business cycle models. 
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equation (9) over the sample period 1952-1988.14 This procedure yields the 
estimated value $=. 80.  l5 
A second-order  autoregressive process is estimated for the inflation 
rate over the period 1953-1989. We assume the absence of trend in the 
inflation rate and find that a second-order  process is sufficient to eliminate 
serial correlation in the residuals.16  The estimated inflation model is 
Note that the intercept implies a steady-state  annual inflation rate of just 
over 4  percent. 
VI. Steady-State  Experiments 
The steady-state  output effects of distortions arising from 
inflation/tax-system interactions (specifically,  from capital-income 
mismeasurement) are reported in table 3.  The experiments reported therein use 
the benchmark parameterization described in table 2.  In addition to the 
linear tax scheme described in the previous section (which we designate the 
Progressive I  case), we consider a less progressive case and a flat-tax-rate 
l4  Because A and p  are not directly observable, we first construct the 
variable  91,  = ln(Y,)-(1-B)ln(L,)  -Bln(K,).  Estimations  of  rl  and the residual series 
Es are then obtained  by regressing the 91  on  a constant,  a time trend,  and its own 
values lagged once. 
l5 This is the value we would expect to find at an annual frequency if the 
autoregressive parameter found from a regression  on quarterly data was roughly 
.95.  Having said this,  we note that the properties we assume for the E,  process 
are not appropriate if the true process is iid at a quarterly frequency.  In  fact, 
the  residual series that we estimate exhibits some serial correlation, which 
indicates the possibility of time aggregation bias in the annual data. 
l6  Trend terms are statistically insignificant  when added to the regression 
model. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmcase.  The parameterizations of each of the separate regimes are chosen to 
yield steady-state  average marginal tax rates of about 23 percent.  l7 
In each of the cases reported in table 3,  the steady-state  output losses 
due to capital-income  mismeasurement are relatively large:  Even in the flat- 
tax case,  a 4  percent steady-state  rate of inflation results in steady-state 
output levels that are only about 95  percent of the levels that would be 
realized in a zero-inflation  steady state. 
The lower panel of table 3 reports the value of output losses per dollar 
of revenue raised through the income tax system.  The losses range from 4.7 
percent (in the flat-tax  case) to 5.2 percent (in the Progressive I case) when 
the steady-state  annual inflation rate is 4  percent.  Although not reported in 
table 3,  almost all of the reduction in output results from a reduction in the 
capital stock,  not from a large reduction in hours worked. 
We emphasize that comparisons across the experiments reported in table 3 
are inappropriate,  since no attempt has been made to standardize tax revenues 
under the different tax codes.  In addition,  the figures reported in table 3 
provide no information about welfare impacts or the relative efficiency of 
raising revenue through inflation/tax interactions relative to statutory tax 
changes in a zero-inflation  environment.  l8  The figures in table 3 are useful 
l7  The  23  percent  figure  is  obtained  from  the  calibration  exercise 
described in  the appendix,  which  uses the Progressive I tax scheme. Although the 
Progressive I tax structure was not a priori chosen to yield this value, it is 
gratifyingly close to  the average value of 25 percent reported by  Sahasakul 
(1986) for effective  marginal tax rates on  personal income over the period 1951- 
1982. 
l8  Naturally,  the  relative  efficiency  of  raising  revenue  through 
inflation/tax  interactions depends  on  the  nature  of  the  alternative being 
contemplated. The life-cycle  nature of  our model implies that individual saving 
is high when income is high.  Tax schemes  with lesser degrees of progressivity 
therefore tend to result in lesser degrees of "crowding-out"  of steady-state 
capital and output for a given revenue requirement. 
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only as a means of demonstrating that the long-run  consequences of the 
inflation/tax interactions we are modeling are significant. 
Table 4  reports the results obtained by repeating the steady-state 
experiments after changing selected values of the benchmark parameters 
reported in table 2.  The picture that emerges from table 4  is that greater 
steady-state  output losses are associated with an increased willingness of 
individuals to shift resources intertemporally (that is,  smaller values of a,, 
al,  and p), smaller rates of depreciation and population growth,  and stronger 
preferences for leisure.  In  general,  these are elements that tend to increase 
per capita saving rates. 
The numbers reported in tables 3 and 4  assume the absence of tax 
arbitrage opportunities that would allow individuals to partially escape the 
distortionary effects of inflation on capital income by changing the way in 
which claims to capital are structured.  We think particularly of shifts 
between debt and equity in a tax environment  where nominal interest payments 
on debt are fully deductible but equity is tax preferred.  The last row of 
table 4  gives results derived from the case where debt and equity instruments 
with these tax characteristics are introduced.  This extension of the model, 
which essentially follows Miller (1977),  is otherwise identical to the basic 
model used in the main body of this paper. 
In the reported simulation,  corporate tax rates are set to 16.5 
percent, and 65  percent of equity income is tax sheltered.  Although 
introducing tax arbitrage opportunities does substantially reduce steady-state 
output losses from capital-income  mismeasurement,  simply stating the 
assumptions of this experiment suggests a problem with implementing this 
particular extension of the model:  The corporate tax rate necessary to 
generate an equilibrium with both debt and equity is extremely small -- much 
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smaller than most estimates of the effective corporate tax rate. 
We could,  of course,  attempt to justify the low corporate tax rate by 
appealing to bankruptcy risk or losses of nondebt tax shields.  Also,  higher 
corporate tax rates could be introduced into the model by increasing the 
fraction of equity income that can  be excluded from the calculation of taxable 
income.  However,  neither of these strategies seems likely to overcome the 
essential problem we face with our current  model choice;  that is,  the 
particular life-cycle  structure of our model does not provide enough 
heterogeneity to generate equilibria with realistic tax arbitrage behavior,  a 
weakness that is manifested in a very small parameter space over which both 
debt and equity are held in the steady-state  equilibrium.lg 
To counter this problem,  we are currently working on extensions of the 
model with intracohort heterogeneity.  We note for present purposes that one 
of the implications  we derive from the dynamic simulations reported in the 
next section is the relatively small effect that inflation/tax interactions 
seem to have on, say,  the variability of output in our model.  In this sense, 
excluding tax arbitrage opportunities strengthens our result. 
VII. llStochastic  Path" Simulations 
The results of simulating the model using the method described in 
l9  This weakness is manifested in two related  ways.  First,  the debt-equity 
ratio is extremely  sensitive  to the rate of inflation.  For the parameterization 
reported  here,  the steady-state  debt-equity  ratio falls from .734  to .225  as the 
steady-state  rate  of  inflation  increases from  0 to 4  percent. (Note also that the 
negative  relationship  between  the  debt-equity  ratio  and  inflation  is 
counterfactual.) Second, small changes  in the  corporate  tax  rate push  all 
individuals to  corners with respect to  their desired holding of particular 
assets.  Holding all else constant, decreasing the  corporate tax rate by 1 
percent  results  in  steady-state equilibria  in  which  only  equity  is  held. 
Increasing the corporate tax rate by 1  percent results in equilibria in which 
only debt is held. 
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section IV are reported in tables 5-7.  Each of the simulation exercises 
assumes the benchmark parameterization given in table 2 and either the flat- 
tax scheme (table 5),  the Progressive I scheme (table 6),  or the intermediate 
Progressive 11 scheme (table 7).  The simulations are conducted for the sample 
period 1951-1988  with actual technology shocks (E,)  as inputs.  In addition, 
for the variable inflation case,  we include actual CPI-U  inflation rates as 
inputs.  In order to minimize the effect of the initial conditions,  we 
calculate simulated sample moments for the observations obtained for the 
period 1955-1988. 
Looking first at the constant inflation cases,  we find that the standard 
deviations of output,  consumption,  and investment are largely invariant to the 
tax regime.  The standard deviation of output is very close to the standard 
deviation found in the data,  with increases in the progressivity of the tax 
code inducing slightly less volatility in output.  The relative standard 
deviation of consumption is also very close to that found in the data (e.g., 
.73 for the Progressive I1 case versus .71 for the U.S. data).  Investment, 
however, is somewhat smoother (relative to variation in output) than suggested 
by the data (2.06 for the Progressive I1 case versus 2.23 for the actual 
data).  The model also exhibits variation in the capital stock that is smaller 
than that in the U.S. economy (as measured by nonresidential fixed capital). 
The relative standard deviation in the Progressive I1 case is .95,  versus 1.15 
for the U.S. economy.  Productivity has slightly too much variability (.91 for 
the Progressive I1 case versus .85 found in the data).  Again, the relative 
standard deviation is not substantially affected by the tax regime when 
inflation is constant. 
The correlations of output with consumption,  investment,  and capital are 
all positive,  but tend to be higher than the correlations found in the actual 
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data.  This is not particularly surprising given the highly specific nature of 
the model and the probable magnitude of noise in the actual data.  Also, the 
standard deviation of hours given by the model is much lower relative to the 
standard deviation of output than is true for the aggregate hours/output 
relationship in the data.  This result is familiar from real business cycle 
studies with the simple type of labor-  and goods-market  structures  we have 
assumed.20 
The ability of the model to mimic the behavior of the U.S.  economy is 
also demonstrated in figures 4  and 5,  which plot the actual and simulated 
paths of hours and capital from 1955-1988.21 
Although the general trend in aggregate hours is replicated by our 
model, figure 4  clearly demonstrates the overly smooth behavior of simulated 
hours relative to actual hours. 
The simulated path of capital matches the data quite well until the late 
1970s,  at which point it begins a decline toward below-mean  values that 
persists through 1988.  The capital stock calculated from the data appears to 
stay above its mean throughout the 1980s,  however.  As we note in the 
20  We do not view our version of the AK  framework as a competitor to 
standard real business cycle models and certainly do not mean to engage in a 
"horse race" of matching moments.  However,  given differences in structure and 
solution approach,  we would be concerned if we were not generally able to claim 
that  our  approach yields results  that  are  in  the  ballpark  of  alternative 
simulation frameworks. In  fact,  we believe that they are.  Consider,  as a basis 
of comparison, the  "basic model"  reported  in McCallum  (1989).  The relative 
standard  deviations  of  consumption,  investment,  capital,  andhours  calculated  for 
quarterly data after application of the Hodrick-Prescott  filter are .31,  3.14, 
.26, and  .52  in  the  model  versus  .73, 3.0, .36, and  .94 in  the  data, 
respectively.  We  feel that our  results compare  favorably to  these.  (Note, 
however, the somewhat different patterns that emerge relative to table 3 under 
the different filtering method.) 
The simulated series in figures 4  and 5 assume the Progressive I1 tax 
regime and are calculated with variability in both inflation and technology. 
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conclusion,  this divergence seems to be an artifact of the way we have 
detrended the capital stock data. 
Without inflation,  the model generates too little variability in 
personal tax revenues and generally too little variability in average marginal 
tax rates.  The variability of both tax measures does increase as the 
progressiveness of the structural tax code increases,  however.  The model also 
generates a high positive contemporaneous correlation between output and our 
tax measures, a result that is clearly at odds with the pattern found in the 
data. 
The bottom panels of tables 5-7  display results obtained when inflation 
is introduced into the model.  Inflation increases the variability of 
consumption and decreases the variability of investment,  but has a minimal 
impact on the standard deviation of output and capital.  The introduction of 
inflation also has little influence on the correlation of these variables with 
output. 
Hours are quite another story.  The relative standard deviation of  hours 
almost doubles in the Progressive I tax structure (from .10  to  .la) when 
actual inflation values are used as inputs.  Depending on the tax structure, 
inflation also affects the correlation between output and hours.  In the 
Progressive I case, the contemporaneous correlation of output and hours falls 
by more than 50  percent, from .52  to  .21.  In the flat-tax  case,  however, the 
relationship  between output and hours changes considerably less,  from .69 to 
.57. 
The Progressive I1 case yields a relative standard deviation of the 
average marginal tax rate and personal tax payments much like the one found in 
the data (.31 and 2.50, respectively,  versus .40  and 2.60 for the actual 
data).  However,  with variable inflation,  the Progressive I1 case delivers an 
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hours/inflation correlation that is more negatively correlated than that found 
in the U.S. economy (-.75  versus -.356  in the data).  The lack of a corporate 
income tax,  and hence the lack of tax arbitrage,  is one reason inflation  has a 
larger impact on this correlation than seems warranted in the data.  In  a 
model with corporate taxes,  nominal interest rates will partially reflect a 
tax-adjusted  Fisher effect,  which would minimize inflation-induced  changes in 
a consumer's after-tax  rate of return. 
The model also does a fairly good job of  mimicking the positive 
correlation  between output and inflation,  consumption  and inflation,  and 
productivity and inflation.  The correlations of productivity and consumption 
with inflation are mimicked reasonably well in both the constant and variable 
inflation  models.  The output/inflation correlation is closer to the data in 
the variable inflation case.  Only with respect to investment are the results 
of the model clearly at odds with the data. 
Overall,  our model seems to be consistent with the phenomena indicated 
in figures 1 and 2 -- a positive correlation  between the level of inflation 
and capital and a negative correlation  between the level of inflation and the 
level of aggregate hours.  This seems surprising at first,  because the nature 
of the tax structure we have imposed on the model is such that inflation- 
induced tax distortions occur only through capital-income  mismeasurement. 
Figures 6 and 7,  which depict the perfect foresight paths of hours and 
capital in response to various combinations of one-time  unanticipated shocks 
to the inflation and technology variables, shed light on why the model 
generates these correlations. Each path is generated by a one-standard- 
deviation increase or decrease to one or both of the relevant variables.  The 
experiments assume the Progressive I  tax regime because it amplifies the tax 
structure found in the Progressive I1 tax regime.  "Good shocks" are a 
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positive shock to the technology variable and a negative shock to inflation, 
and "bad shocks" are a negative shock to the technology variable and a 
positive shock to inflation. 
The interesting cases in figures 6  and 7  are those with one good shock 
and one bad shock.  Consider the combination  of a positive technology shock 
and a positive inflation shock.  This combination is associated with capital 
rising above its mean but hours that are below average.  Just the opposite is 
true for the combination  of a negative technology shock and a negative 
inflation shock -- capital moves below average while hours move above average. 
The message here is that,  with respect to the evolution of the capital 
stock,  changes in the level of the technology variable dominate distortions 
associated  with tax distortions arising from inflation/tax interactions in the 
personal tax code.  We infer that the positive correlation between capital and 
inflation does not reflect a positive causal relationship from inflation to 
capital,  but rather coincidental correlations between the technology variable 
and capital and the technology variable and inflation.  Indeed,  although the 
contemporaneous  relationship between the technology variable and inflation is 
small,  the relationship is stronger -- and positive -- with inflation led one 
period. 
How does the negative correlation  between aggregate hours and inflation 
arise in a model in  which the tax liability of labor income per se is 
protected from inflation  by the indexing scheme we have assumed in our 
calculations?  This pattern arises through two channels by which the 
overstatement  of capital income spills over into individual leisure decisions. 
The first channel is a direct result of the fact that inflation-induced 
changes in  nominal asset income increase an individual's real tax on  capital 
income.  In  particular, inflation decreases an individual's  after-tax  rate of 
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return on savings,  causing individuals to substitute toward current leisure. 
The second channel occurs because,  with a progressive income tax, 
marginal tax rates increase with nominal capital income,  which in turn affects 
both the return to saving and the future after-tax  real wage.  The fact that 
the model's outputfiours correlation  and the standard deviation of hours 
change substantially when progressivity is introduced into the tax system 
suggests the importance of this type of phenomenon. 
VIII. Concluding Remarks 
We originally set out to uncover possible business cycle effects that 
might arise from inflation/personal-tax interactions working through capital- 
income mismeasurement in inflationary environments.  We suspected that we 
would find substantial variation in capital accumulation arising from this 
channel.  We did not. 
Instead,  we found effects in an unexpected place -- the behavior of 
aggregate hours.  We fully believe that understanding the cyclical behavior of 
labor will involve enriching models in ways not considered here (as in 
Christian0 and Eichenbaum [1990],  for instance).  Based on our experiments,  we 
suggest another element that may be useful in developing an understanding of 
the dynamic behavior of aggregate hours -- labor supply distortions that arise 
specifically through distortions associated with both the direct effects of 
capital-income  mismeasurement and the more indirect effects of bracket creep. 
Our extension of the AK  framework,  which easily incorporates structural tax 
schemes, seems well suited to  this task. 
Another surprising finding is that the positive correlation between 
capital and inflation does not reflect any causal relationship, i.e., it seems 
to arise from the correlation between inflation and the Solow residual found 
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in the data.  Our model did a good job of matching the correlation  between the 
model's  capital series and the actual inflation rates for the U.S. economy 
even  when we assumed a constant inflation rate. 
Further investigation of the mechanisms that yield the results reported 
here is clearly in order.  As noted by the discussants, the "stylized facts" 
of the inflationfiours and inflation/capital relationships considered  here are 
somewhat puzzling and may not hold up to further scrutiny.  Our preliminary 
investigations,  for instance,  suggest that the negative inflationfiours 
correlation  may be sensitive to the data used in the construction of the 
aggregate hours variable,  which is based on establishment survey data rather 
than on the broader household survey data.  It is unclear whether the model 
would match the pattern of hours measured by the household data,  since a 
different measure of aggregate hours would imply a different series for the 
Solow residuals. 
The behavior of the capital stock series does appear to be sensitive to 
our detrending method.  In fact,  while the positive inflation/capital 
correlation remains when capital is detrended by its own deterministic time 
trend, the time path of the capital stock series behaves much like the 
simulated series depicted in figure 5. 
Despite these caveats, it seems clear that inflation/nominal-tax 
interactions can have quite unanticipated effects on the macroeconomy,  and 
that the type of simulation framework developed here can aid in understanding 
what these effects might be. 
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www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 1: Sample Moments, U.S. Data 1955-1988, 
Common   rend* 
Standard  Contemporaneous Correlation 
Variable  ~eviation*"  With Output  With .~r 
Kev  : 
Y: Gross National Product. Source: 1990 Economic Report of the President 
(EROP) . 
C: Personal Consumption Expenditures,  Nondurable Goods and Services. 
Source: EROP. 
I: Gross Private Domestic Fixed Investment,  Source: EROP. 
H: Total Annual Hours: E*AvgH*52,  where E = Total Civilian Employment 
and AvgH = Total Private Nonagricultural Establishments Average 
Weekly Hours. Sources: EROP and Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
K: Fixed Private Nonresidential Capital,  Net of Depreciation. Source: 
Survev of Current Business,  October 1989. 
T: Personal Tax and Nontax Payments. Source: EROP. 
T': Average Marginal Personal Tax Rate. Source: Sahasakul (1986). 
.~r: Percent Change in the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Wage 
Earners. Source: EROP. 
* All variables except T' and H refer to the logarithm of real per capita 
values (in 1982 dollars) relative to a common linear time trend.  Hours 
are not detrended. The average marginal tax rate is not expressed in per 
capita terms,  but rather as a deviation from its own trend. 
** The standard deviation for output refers to the absolute percentage 
deviation of the detrended series.  All other standard deviations are 
expressed relative to the standard deviation of Y. 
t  In an earlier draft of this paper,  we mistakenly reported the capital stock 
correlations using the one-year-ahead  stock  values.  Because reported 
capital stock figures are end-of-year,  the contemporaneous values are the 
appropriate ones.  We are grateful to Finn Kydland for drawing our 
attention to this point. 
+  The moments for average marginal tax rates are calculated for the sample 
period 1951-1982. 












Utility Weight of 
Leisure 
Population  Growth 
Rate 
Capital Share in 
Product  ion 
Depreciation  Rate 
of Capital 
Productivity 
Endowment of an 
Age t Individual 
Value 
1.0 
* Given  by the formula rt = 4.47 + 0.033t -  0.00067t2. 
Sources: See text. 







Loss Per Dollar 
Revenue ~ained- 
Flat  3.46  3.88 
Progressive I  4.06  4.67 
Progressive I1  3.64  4.13 
* Marginal tax rates for an individual  with taxable income y are calculated as 
follows:  Flat -- g(y)  =  .23 
Progressive I -- g(y)  =  .I46 +  .0000023*y 
Progressive I1 -- g(y)  =  .20  +  .000000789*y 
** Absolute losses are given by the percentage reduction in steady-state 
output relative to the zero-inflation  steady state. 
*** Losses per dollar of revenue gained are given by -(Y,-Yo)/(Rev,-Revo), 
where Revo (Yo) is total revenue raised by distortionary taxation (total 
output) in the zero-inflation  steady state and Rev,  (Y,)  is total revenue 
raised from distortionary taxation (total output) in the steady state with 
the indicated inflation rate. 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 4: Steady-State Output Losses: Alternative 
~arameterizations* 
Loss Per Dollar 
Parameter Change  Absolute Loss  Revenue Gained 
Equity Modelt  1.3%  2.74 
** All figures are calculated assuming the Progressive I  tax regime and a 4 
percent annual inflation rate. See the notes to tables 1 and 2 for further 
explanation. 
t  See text for basic description.  A more detailed explanation is available 
from the authors upon request. 
Source:  Authors' calculations. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 5: Model Moments, Flat-Tax  case* 
CONSTANT INFLATION 
Standard  Contemporaneous Correlation 
Variable  Deviat  ion**  With Output  With rt 
VARIABLE INFLATION 
Standard  Contemporaneous Correlation 
Variable  Deviat  ion**  With Output  With r 
* Simulated path based on actual realizations of technology variable and 
inflation rates from 1955-1988.  Definitions of the variables correspond 
roughly.  to the real data counterparts defined in table 1. 
** The standard deviation for output refers to the absolute percentage 
deviation of the model series relative to the standard deviation of 
detrended GNP reported in table 1.  All other standard deviations are 
expressed relative to the simulated standard deviation of Y. 
t  Figures represent the contemporaneous correlations with the indicated 
variables and actual inflation  rates. 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmVariable 
Table 6: Model Moments, Progressive I Tax case* 
CONSTANT INFLATION 
Standard  Contemporaneous Correlation 
Deviation  With Output  With A 
VARIABLE INFLATION 
Standard  Contemporaneous Correlation 
Variable  Deviation  With Output  With A 
* Assumes T' =  .I46 +  .0000023*y,  where y  is individual taxable income. For 
other definitions, see the notes to table 5. 
Source: Authors'  calculations. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 7: Model Moments, Progressive I1 Tax casef 
CONSTANT INFLATION 
Standard  Contemporaneous Correlation 
Variable  Deviation  With Output  With .~r 
VARIABLE INFLATION 
Standard  Contemporaneous Correlation 
Variable  Deviation  With Output  With .~r 
* Assumes T'  =  .20  +  .000000789*y,  where y is individual taxable income. For 
other definitions, see the notes to table 4. 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmAPPENDIX: CALIBRATION OF THE TAX CODE 
Because our simulation model is geared toward capturing the average 
effects of life-cycle  behavior,  we calibrate gross income levels so that the 
highest level of cohort income in the model roughly coincides with the highest 
cohort-average  income in the data.  Taking 1988 as the reference year,  the 
highest level of age-cohort  median income is obtained for households with 
heads age 45-54. The median income for this group is $38,213 in 1988 
dollars.'  We convert this number to an average by scaling according to the 
ratio of average-to-median  income for all households in 1988.  Doing so yields 
an average income for the 45-54  year-old  cohort of $47,776. 
We chose the 1965 tax code as the basis for our benchmark tax code. 
Because high income in our model is about $50,000 (by design), we estimate the 
relationship  between marginal tax rates and taxable income for income values 
through $52,212 (in 1988 dollars).  The resulting regression yields the values 
for go and gl given in the text. 
The scale of our output measure is chosen so that the highest gross 
income generated by the model in a steady state with the chosen tax schedule 
and inflation set to 1.8  percent (the actual inflation rate measured by the 
CPI-U  in 1965) equals $47,766  in 1988 dollars. 
Taxable income levels are obtained by adjusting gross income for 
deductions and personal exemptions.  In the benchmark case,  we assume that all 
1  The data used in constructing high cohort income were obtained from the 
Current Po~ulation  Reports (Series P-60,  No. 166),  published by the Bureau of 
the Census. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmtaxpayers take a standard deduction equal to $1479 in 1988  dollar^.^  The 
personal exemption level in 1965 was $600,  or $2254 in 1988 dollars. 
Multiplying by 3.31,  the average household size in 1965,  yields total personal 
exemptions of $7460 in 1988 dollars.  Taxable income, and hence the tax base, 
is thus arrived at by subtracting these deduction and exemption levels from 
gross income levels. 
2  The 1965 personal tax code provided for a standard deduction equal to the 
lower of 10  percent of adjusted gross income or $1000.  Using the 1965 
Statistics of Income for Individual Taxpayers,  we calculated that the average 
standard deduction was $394.  The $1479 figure was arrived at by converting 
the $394 to 1988 dollars using the CPI-U, 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm